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Changing competitive dynamics in the reinsurance industry: implications of 
changes in buyer behavior for reinsurance executives 
by Paula Jarzabkowski, Professor of Strategy, Cass Business School, City University, 
Rebecca Bednarek, Research Fellow, Cass Business School, City University and  
Laure Cabantous, Senior Lecturer, Cass Business School, City University
This paper explores how reinsurers can meet the rapid changes occurring in their 
industry, arising from primary industry consolidation, and changes in cedent (insurance irm) buyer behavior toward bundled reinsurance products and alternative sources 
of capital. The paper makes the following suggestions for reinsurers. Reinsures need 
to be proactive in responding to changing patterns of premium volume and develop 
partnerships with global clients. Smaller reinsurers, in particular, will need to look to develop competitive niches and joint-ventures in order to be signiicant to these large 
cedents. Furthermore, reinsures need to continue investing in analytical expertise and 
resources in order to address the complex needs of their clients. Finally, reinsurers will 
be increasingly required to engage in alternative risk transfer products, and there will be 
early-mover advantages in doing so meaningfully. 
Executive 
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Abstract
In recent years, the structure of the reinsurance industry has evolved rapidly in response 
to, among other factors, changes in the nature of risks to be insured (e.g., climate related risks), technological innovations (e.g., Cat models), the globalization of the inancial 
services industry, and the concentration of the primary insurance industry. Drawing on 
a global qualitative dataset of interviews and observations in all the main reinsurance 
markets, this article provides an overview of the changing dynamics in the reinsurance 
industry and highlights some of the implications of these changes for reinsurers. We irst provide a general overview of the changing structure of the reinsurance industry, 
highlighting its increasingly competitive nature and why these changes might exert pressure on reinsurer’s proits. Second, we focus on consolidation in the primary industry 
as a central industry dynamic. Third, we show how this impacts the types of reinsurance 
products cedents want from the reinsurance industry. Finally, we outline some 
implications of this for reinsurers, identifying matters of both strategic and operational 
concern for them. 
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Introduction
The modern reinsurance industry, which is basically the 
insurance of insurers, has a long history, at least in Western Europe, with the irst reinsurance treaties arising in Germany after 1820 and the irst reinsurance company, Kolnische 
Ruchversicherungsgesellschraft (Cologne Re), founded in 
1842 [Kopt (1929)]. Historically, there has been little change 
and a relatively slow rate of innovation in the reinsurance 
industry [Tuohy (2008)]. More recently, however, this mature industry, which is part of the global inancial service industry, is experiencing intensiied competition and regulation. In 
particular, as a result of consolidation in the primary insurance 
industry, cedents (i.e., the insurers who look to buy risk cover 
from reinsurers) are changing the way they buy reinsurance, and 
these changes are escalating rapidly with many implications for 
reinsurers. In this article, we explore the increasingly competitive 
and changing dynamics of the reinsurance industry, and the 
implications of these dynamics for reinsurance executives. 
To do so, we draw from a novel qualitative study of the global 
reinsurance industry, which covered the industry’s main players 
and markets (see textbox 1). 
Our analysis of the structure of the reinsurance industry, which is based on Porter’s ive forces framework, irst shows why it is more dificult to make money in the reinsurance industry than 
ever before [Porter (1980)]. Second, we conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the industry life cycle of the primary insurance 
industry. Third, this lifecycle analysis reveals how consolidation 
in cedents’ buying of reinsurance is evolving the very notion of 
the reinsurance product as cedents’ needs shift to a new class 
of product. Such changes are evidently hard for most reinsurers 
to respond to and keep abreast of. We will, therefore, end with 
the implications of such trends for reinsurance executives. We 
highlight implications for different types of reinsurers as well as speciic issues in relation to the internal operations of reinsurers, the speciic issue of non-traditional reinsurance products 
(Alternative Risk Transfer) and reinsurance needs in emerging 
markets. 
General overview of the reinsurance industry structure
A review of the reinsurance industry suggests that the “risk 
business” is getting riskier and more competitive. To structure the indings of our empirical research we use Michael Porter’s (1980) “ive forces” framework. Porter’s model is a tool derived 
from industrial economics that is widely used for analyzing the 
attractiveness of an industry (i.e., its potential to generate higher than average proit margins) and for classifying features that affect the degree of competition in the industry. It identiies that industry structure, and its associated proit margins are determined by the interplay of ive forces: bargaining power of 
buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, threat of new entrants, 
threat of substitute products, and intensity of industry rivalry. 
In the reinsurance industry, our analysis suggests that the proitability in the non-life reinsurance segment (our focus here) is 
eroding [Datamonitor (2011)].
 
First, and foremost, is buyer power. In reinsurance terms, 
insurers pay to “cede” or transfer risk to reinsurers, and these 
insurance-industry buyers are therefore known as “cedents.” 
As will be discussed in more depth below, the general trend for 
insurers is consolidation, meaning bigger and more powerful 
cedents. Of course, buyer power is not uniform; smaller 
insurers and insurers in emerging markets remain highly 
reliant on reinsurance as a proxy for capital, freeing up internal 
capital reserves to fund growth. But considered as a group, 
cedents have been bulked-up by consolidation into large, often 
global, insurance companies that are “heavy hitters” in their 
negotiations with reinsurers. Large cedents have massive 
market capitalizations that can be far superior to those of large 
The primary data for this study was conducted over three years from 2009 to 2012. It consisted of:  
1. 22 reinsurance irms, 3 brokerage irms and 36 insurance irms across 17 countries, and 61 ofices in all non-life 
lines of business
2. 837 observations of multiple interactions and periods of 
analysis 3. 446 interviews (reinsurers, brokers and cedents) 
 
Following 2012, extensive secondary data, for example, 
press articles and reports, and conversations with industry, 
for example, meetings with senior executives and strategy 
Masterclasses for reinsurance professionals continue. 
Textbox 1: Global reinsurance study Source: Bank of England calculations
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reinsurers. For example, Allianz, a major European insurance irm, had a market capitalization of €53.4 billion (in August of 2013), its reinsurer Munich Re’s market capitalization was €24.4 billion and Hannover Re’s was €7.1 billion1. These large cedents 
also place billions of dollars of insurance, and thus dwarf even 
the largest reinsurers in terms of premium volume; while AXA 
as one of the largest insurers in the world underwrote U.S.$108 
billion in premium in 2010; Munich Re, as the largest reinsurer, underwrote “only” U.S.$29.3 billion [Reactions (2012)]. Such 
large cedents can, therefore, use their buyer power to lower 
the rates they pay for the amount of reinsurance cover they 
buy. Ultimately, they can afford to reduce their cover as their 
size allows them to retain more of their risks in-house (see 
below). Thus, in general, consolidation of cedents is squeezing reinsurance proits.
Substitute products are threatening if they offer a better price-
performance ratio than an industry’s core products. In many 
segments of the global reinsurance market, for over a decade 
cedents have been using methods of Alternative Risk Transfer 
(ART), primarily in the form of Cat bonds, as a cheaper substitute 
for traditional reinsurance products [Loubergé, et al. (1999), Bougen, (2003)]. Cat bonds are insurance-linked securities for which returns depend on the occurrence of a speciic insurance 
event. They are not normally considered part of the core 
reinsurance market, as they are not generally offered by reinsurers, but rather by hedge funds and pension funds. In fact, since 1996, 
the Cat bond market has seen U.S.$44b of cumulative reinsurance 
issuance. While Cat bonds, together with the hedge funds and pension funds that provide them, took a hit in the inancial crisis, 
they have since bounced back and, by 2012, reached their highest 
level for new issuances and outstanding volumes in four years [Aon Benield (2012a)]. All of this is money that is not going to 
reinsurers via traditional reinsurance products. Furthermore, 
importantly Cat bonds usually compete favorably on price with 
traditional reinsurance products, placing further competitive 
pressure on reinsurers.2 Another important form of substitution is internal retention: cedents simply doing without the reinsurance 
1 2013 capitalization igures collected from company websites (August, 2013):  https://www.allianz.com/en/investor_relations/share/share-price.html;  http://www.munichre.com/en/ir/shares/key_igures/default.aspx ;  http://www.hannover-re.com/ir/share/keyigures/index.htm2 For example: http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/07/12/ils-and-collateralized-capital-low-beneits-reinsurance-buyers-at-renewals-aon/
product by instead covering in-house more of their own risks. 
This option is in fact connected to the increased buyer power described above. As one chairman of a large cedent outlined: “In 
the long term if you understand risk capital and how it works then 
you keep more of your risk yourself. But, no doubt, the long-
term consequence is to reduce the amount of reinsurance that you place. In our case, we placed a ifth less than we did just ive 
years ago.” (Cedent, interview) For instance, in-house retention of 
casualty and property-per-risk is increasing as cedents increasingly 
consider that they can carry more of these risks themselves, rather than transferring them to reinsurers [Aon Benield (2012b)]. In 
general, use of substitute products, and internal retention, both of 
which deprive reinsurers of premium, are increasing as a result of 
consolidation in the insurance industry. 
Reinsurers are reliant on various types of suppliers, such as suppliers of capital (e.g., capital inlows from investors within the broader inancial market), suppliers of analytic 
services (e.g., risk modelling companies), suppliers of other services (e.g., brokerage irms) and the general supply of 
human resources — well-trained, highly skilled staff. If the 
cost of capital, services or human resource goes up, it eats into reinsurance proitability. To provide two examples, let us 
consider the power of brokers (the intermediaries or suppliers 
of clients to reinsurers) and modelling companies. First, in the 
past years, brokers have consolidated alongside their buyers 
(see above), so attaining global scale and scope. As a result, three main global brokers, Aon Benield, Guy Carpenter and Willis, now have 85% market share of the industry.3 These 
changes have resulted in a largely oligopolistic broking market. 
As these brokers have grown in size, the reinsurance industry 
has become increasingly “brokered” and previous “direct” 
(non-brokered) markets such as Europe increasingly depend on brokers in a way that was unthinkable 15 years ago. New 
players use brokers to access new markets and previously-
direct reinsurers are also increasingly relying on them. Further, 
as these large consolidated brokers have grown in strength, 
they are more able to provide services to their clients (such 
as analytics) which large reinsurers used to provide as part 
of their differentiation, so increasing competitive pressure on 
reinsurers.
3 Source: http://www.holborn.com/%5CData%5CSites%5C1%5Cpdfcontent%5CBestsReview-
HoldingTheirOwn.pdf  
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Second, modelling companies form another important group of 
suppliers to the reinsurance sector. Even if reinsurers have their 
own internal models, they are reliant on three big modelling 
companies, AIR, RMS and EQE4 , due to the widespread usage in 
the industry of these few select models. Modelling companies are 
suppliers for the industry as a whole, providing a framework for 
analyzing risk which brokers and cedents — as well as reinsurers’ 
competitors — use. The power of these modelling companies 
has increased as the industry has become more technical in 
the last decade. This is partly in response to the demands of 
regulation; and partly because of cedents’ bundling of analytically 
challenging “super-risks” (discussed below). In general, increasing 
technical sophistication is giving more power to suppliers of 
analytical models, and to potential reinsurance employees with 
rare technical skills; both drive up the cost base for reinsurance 
operation. 
Like substitute products, new entrants compete on the basis of 
price-performance ratios, but as industry outsiders they have to 
overcome barriers to entry. In reinsurance, close longstanding 
relationships between reinsurers and cedents have traditionally 
posed an important barrier to entry; but recently, their 
perceived value to cedents seems to have waned. The regulatory 
environment represents another such barrier to entry due to its (increasingly) stringent nature (Directive 2009/138/EC of the 
European Parliament and Council). While these barriers offer 
some protection for incumbent reinsurers, they are far from 
insurmountable especially from among hedge funds and insurers. 
Such companies can more easily scale entry barriers, using their prior knowledge and resources. As reinsurers explained: “Hedge 
funds — we see them as a threat because they take the steam 
out of our market. Smart money knows when there is money to be made. So when proitability is high, “Money” goes and starts 
a new Bermuda entity, and that takes a little bit of the steam out 
of our market” (Reinsurer, interview). In particular, hedge funds 
have been providing both CAT bonds (as described above) in the 
reinsurance market and also traditional reinsurance products. 
Consequently, the two trends of new entrants and substitute 
products are closely connected. With their established pools of 
investment capital, they jump the barriers to entry represented 
by the capital intensity of reinsurance. In particular, there was 
4 EQECAT: http://www.eqecat.com/; RMS (Risk Management Solutions): http://www.rms.com/; AIR Worldwide: http://www.air-worldwide.com
a strong increase in the number of such new entrants following the 2005 hurricane season (which included Katrina), when rates 
where at a historical high, a phenomenon referred to as the “new 
Bermudian market.”5
In 2011–12, several well-known hedge funds continued to 
announce the formation of reinsurance companies in response to ickle investment opportunities elsewhere, and because 
they wanted to use reinsurance premium as a captive pool of 
capital to reinvest in the hedge fund itself. Examples include two U.S.$500m Bermudian reinsurance companies, TP Re and 
SAC Re, set up by hedge funds in 2012.6 This trend continues to increase: 2013 saw the largest ever Cat bond issued to a irst 
5 Jarzabkowski, P., M. Smets, R. Bednarek, and A. Allocato, 2013. “Re-think reinsurance,” Global 
Reinsurance Masterclass Series6  Source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/with-lax-regulation-a-risky-industry-lourishes-offshore/
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Suppliers have hugely increased the pool of capital invested in reinsurance, driving rates down.
Increased use of substitutes, such as Cat bonds have diverted premium away from traditional reinsurance products. 
New entrants, diversifying from hedge fund or insurance company activity, have divided the reinsurance pie ever more thinly.
Buyers have consolidated and gained power to drive down rates by bundling risk, or by retaining it.
Rivalry between reinsurers has intensified as more incumbents are competing over a smaller pie of ceded premium.
Regulation has driven standardization, transparency and technicalization and, in so doing, has reduced the ability  of reinsurers  
to differentiate themselves on criteria other than price. 
Figure 1. Porter’s ive forces analysis; reinsurance industry [Porter (1980)] 5
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time sponsor, a U.S.$750m issue for Citizens Property Insurance 
(Florida). This was a company that many thought would never tap the Cat bond market; but for Citizens the beneits were clear: 
“they have upped their overall level (of cover) … at a lower rate 
than what Citizens paid in the reinsurance market last year.”7 
Increased rivalry. As Figure 1 shows, our analysis suggests that every one of the ive forces has increased its pressure on reinsurance proits over the past couple of years, and led to intense rivalry 
between reinsurers. As one reinsurer states of this recent increased competitiveness: “There has been a big change from an almost guaranteed proit … to much more capital lowing in to the industry, 
and really leading to new products and much increased competition. At the end of the day, it has become much more dificult to make 
money with reinsurance” [Reinsurer, interview]. In particular, this 
is because many of these dynamics are interrelated — for example, 
cedent power, ability to retain risk rather than cede it as reinsurance 
premium, and an increased ability by those powerful cedents to 
engage with new capital providers, such as hedge funds, to provide 
new products, such as Cat bonds. In the following section, we explore 
one of the primary sources of this increasing pressure.
The insurance industry life cycle: a mature industry facing 
increasing concentration
Trends in the primary insurance industry are likely to change 
what insurance companies need from their reinsurers. We now 
discuss the insurance industry life cycle [Klepper and Miller (1995), Peltoniemi (2011)], provide evidence of consolidation 
in this industry and show how this consolidation impacts the 
products reinsurers are required to deliver.
 
While in some developing  markets, such as those in parts 
of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, the number of 
insurance companies is growing [SwissRe (2011)], the overall 
trend in the insurance industry is one of consolidation into a small number of key players [Connings (2013); Applebaum 
(2012)]. For example, in the U.S., the 10 largest Property and Casualty insurance companies now control 50% of the 
entire U.S. insurance market; and in auto insurance, that share is held by just ive companies [Applebaum, (2012)]. This 
7 Source: http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2012/06/07/everglades-re-catastrophe-bond-was-cheaper-than-reinsurance-for-citizens/; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-23/ lorida-outperforms-as-hurricane-forecast-improves-muni-credit.html.
consolidation is consistent with the industry life cycle analysis, 
which predicts that industries heading toward maturity, such 
as the insurance industry — are characterized by the shakeout 
of small players, as Figure 2 shows.
Over the last 10 years, large insurance companies have sought 
to enhance their product and geographic reach, client base and operating eficiency (i.e., economies of scale and synergies) 
through a range of organic growth, joint venture and M&A 
activity. For instance, both the number and the value of M&A 
activities have increased in the insurance industry over the last decade [Deloitte (2012a)]; and in December 2012 alone, 75 deals worth a total of US$18.25b were reported.89
 
As powerful insurance companies have grown, and moved to the new and more proitable emerging markets, smaller insurers 
have protected their bottom lines by divesting non-core or 
underperforming businesses and subsidiaries, while withdrawing from foreign markets where they lacked suficient scale [Deloitte 
(2012b)]. Such growth in leading insurers indeed correlates with 
a decrease in the overall number of players in mature markets. 
8 Jarzabkowski, P., A. Allocato, R. Bednarek and M. Smets, 2013. “Fit for purpose? How to tailor 
reinsurance products to insurance lifecycles,” Global Reinsurance Masterclass Series.9 Source: http://www.reactionsnet.com/Article/3137361/Regions/23102/Insurance-M-A-fell-in-2012-to-54bn.html;
Introduction Growth/Shakeout Maturity Decline
Time
Profits
Consolidation, as many small 
firms are unable to survive, 
except through M&A
The market is 
dominated by a few 
large/global firms
Key: the shaded 
area indicates the 
point at which 
growth in industry 
revenue is 
accompanied by  
a shakeout in the 
number of firms 
in the market
Figure 2: The industry life-cycle model [Klepper and Miller (1995); Peltoniemi 
(2011)] 8
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For example, the number of companies in Europe fell by almost 3% in 2011, with the number in some more crowded markets, such as the U.K. dropping by as much as 8% in a single year [Insurance Europe (2013)]. The “lost” companies failed in the 
face of competitive pressure, merged, or were acquired. The 
impact of such consolidation is evident, with large players now 
dominating insurance markets. Their presence is felt through 
their size, as evidenced by their massive market capitalization, 
and their scope in operating across multiple markets. In short, 
over the last 10 years (between 2002 and 2011), on average, 
leading insurance companies increased their total revenues by approximately 37%.10 Further, 20 of the top 25 companies 
increased their asset size in 2011 [AM Best (2012)]. 
The global consolidation of insurers, resulting from the fact that 
this industry is now mature, changes cedents’ strategies for 
buying reinsurance. In the following sections, we discuss how 
industry life cycle effects cascade from the primary insurance 
industry to affect the reinsurance industry. 
The implications of cedent consolidation for  
reinsurance buying
Our research shows that insurers do not all want the same type 
of reinsurance product from reinsurers. Depending on their size 
for instance, insurance companies have different priorities in 
the purpose, products and organization of reinsurance buying. Speciically, we identiied differences in the reinsurance needs 
of four central types of cedents (see textbox 2). This means that 
as the general industry trend moves away from local market 
players and becomes dominated by global and regional players 
the reinsurance products that reinsurers are required to deliver 
also change. 
What determines cedent buying preferences? 
From our research, we found that cedents’ reinsurance buying needs (or preferences) depend on two main criteria: their 
capitalization and the need for central coordination. These 
depend on size and scope of the insurer. 
10 This percentage has been calculated considering the total revenues growth of select leading companies reported in Datamonitor in 2002–12. When the speciic data was missing, it was 
read on the investor relations section of the company website.
• Capitalization — the purpose of reinsurance is to support risk 
transfer through capital provision. In general, insurers need 
to hold capital reserves in order to cover potential payouts to 
their policyholders in the event of losses. Reinsurance transfers 
some of the primary-insurers’ risk to reinsurers who, in return 
for a premium payment, hold their own capital in reserve for 
large payouts to multiple policyholders in the case of an event 
that causes a particularly large loss. This enables insurers to 
cover more clients without holding all the capital themselves 
or free up some of their capital to invest in furthering their growth ambitions. Insurers’ level of capitalization inluences 
their reinsurance needs. Less well-capitalized (i.e., smaller) 
players require reinsurance as a source of affordable capital, 
enabling them to grow or to cover greater risk for their clients. 
By contrast, well-capitalized insurers, particularly those with high capital eficiency arising from well-diversiied portfolios, do not 
need reinsurance to either grow or to transfer some of the risk 
from their portfolio.11 Rather, they require it to cover peak risk 
— those “Armageddon scenarios” where a single event, such as 
a hurricane, or the asbestos crisis, wipes out a major part of the portfolio, and the company is looded with claims. The growth of 
such large well-capitalized players arising from the consolidation 
11 They can, however, make their capital go further by holding highly diverse risks, which 
are unlikely to be triggered by a single social trend, or change in business conditions, or 
environmental catastrophe.
1. Emerging market insurers are those that operate in a 
single emerging market territory, or in a small number of 
similar territories and require reinsurance for access to 
capital and to alleviate overall portfolio volatility. 
2. Local insurers are those that, while well-established 
within well-known territories, still practice largely within 
their country or state of origin. 3. Regional insurers are those that have extended beyond 
their domestic market to include surrounding regions. 
4. Global insurers are at the peak of all three dimensions, 
as they operate in diverse territories and cover different 
lines of business through their complex multidivisional 
structure.
Textbox 2: Insurer-types
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outlined above is, therefore, changing their reliance on 
reinsurance cover and the types of products they require. 
• Need for coordination — the need for coordination is a 
function of the insurer’s size and scope. As insurance 
companies grow into new markets, they evolve from 
allowing local operating companies (LOC) to purchase 
their own local reinsurance cover to coordinating buying 
centrally across all LOCs. This central coordination of reinsurance purchasing enables capital eficiency through diversiication, avoids duplication regarding the reinsurance being bought as a irm acquires more LOCs, and ensures 
that a group has oversight of, and is adequately hedged for, 
risks taken by LOCs. By contrast, smaller companies have fewer opportunities for capital eficiency and less need 
for formal coordination of reinsurance buying. Globally 
coordinated purchasing of reinsurance is also a more eficient and less costly working practice. Consequently, 
with the growth of global cedents, there are more 
opportunities for coordination — globally and regionally — 
whereby risks across multiple LOCs worldwide or regionally, 
such as aggregated catastrophe covers, can be “bundled” 
together. This will now be discussed.
The rise of super-risks and alterative risk transfer products
As discussed above, the types of reinsurance products that 
cedents need depend on their capitalization level and their 
need for coordination, which are, in turn, a feature of their size. 
The reinsurance industry has, therefore, become dominated 
by products that align with large, well-capitalized and centrally 
coordinated global buyers’ changing reinsurance needs. Speciically, our research identiied three main reinsurance 
products that are associated with different types of cedents’ needs:12 
•  Bouquet products bundle multiple or heterogeneous lines 
of business13 all related to a single territory and are usually 
associated with quite small, local and emerging market buyers 
and small insurers.14 
12 Jarzabkowski, P., Allocato, A., Bednarek R. and M. Smets, 2013. “Fit for purpose? How to 
tailor reinsurance products to insurance lifecycles”, Global Reinsurance Materclass Series.13 Line of business is the general classiication of type of (re)insurance being written, i.e., homeowner, aviation and marine, among others (http://www.guycarp.com/content/guycarp/en/home/the-company/media-resources/glossary/l.html).
• Standalone products cover one line of business, for example a 
single type of risk, such as a third party motor liability product, within a clearly deined territory or closely related territories, 
and are usually associated with local buyers that have grown to be signiicant in their local markets but have little business 
outside these markets. 14
• Super-risk products bundle reinsurance cover from a 
homogenous line of business, such as catastrophe risk, across multiple perils, such as wind and lood, and multiple territories; 
increasingly globally. These products are usually associated 
with global and regional buyers who want to centralize their 
buying.
Our analysis shows that, as a result of consolidation, some 
of these traditional reinsurance products are declining, while 
those that meet the needs of large insurance companies are 
increasingly dominant and command the majority of premiums in 
the reinsurance industry.
14 When insurance companies are very small and it is therefore not worthwhile for reinsurers to 
reinsurer their portfolio as standalone programmes they typically bundle different lines (e.g., 
marine combined with property) into a single reinsurance product, the bouquet. Demand for 
a bouquet can also be connected to not having enough statistics on the various parts of your 
portfolio to place on their own. 
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Implication 1: Declining bouquet purchases and  
standalone products
Given the industry trends outlined above, demand for these 
“bouquet” and “standalone” products will decrease or remain 
stable in the coming years. Linked with very small, local and 
emerging market buyers, these bouquet products or “bundled 
heterogeneous” products are declining in popularity. As one CEO of a reinsurance company stated: “It’s [bouquets] something of 
the past. There are a few bouquets around Eastern European ... 
but this is being phased out more. Because bouquets are simply 
blurring the picture, you want to ensure that you look at each 
business on its own merits … I don’t think there’s a future for 
bouquet placements at the moment” [Reinsurer]. While, they 
remain in demand in some emerging markets and from some small insurers, where irms have risks that are too small to be 
attractive to reinsurers on a standalone basis, they remain a small 
and decreasing part of the reinsurance market. 
Stand-alone products are also a traditional product that used to 
dominate reinsurance. However, these single line and territory 
products are under threat as local market buyers decline and larger players seek greater eficiency in their reinsurance spend through centrally coordinated purchasing. Speciically, as global 
players acquire local companies, standalone reinsurance products 
disappear from the market, and are being replaced by their new 
parents’ bundled “super-risks”, which we now discuss. 
Implication 2: Increasing global and regional covers  
(super-risks)
The dominant players in the industry — large regional and global 
insurance players — require bundled homogenous products 
that we term “super-risks”. These super-risks are popular with 
large insurers because bundling of homogeneous risks, such 
as catastrophe risk across perils and territories, into single “super-risks” products, enables capital eficiency and increases reinsurance purchasing eficiency through greater coordination. 
For instance, the resurgent American International Group (AIG) is undertaking a signiicant consolidation of its property per risk reinsurance by buying a single U.S.$1.5b global treaty, further 
demonstrating the trend of major insurers to streamline their own 
risk transfer into single super-risk products.15 
15 Source: http://www.insuranceinsider.com/consolidation-fuels-centralised-reinsurance-buying-trend?
Super-risk products are, therefore, growing, indicating the 
effects of consolidation in the primary insurance industry upon 
the reinsurance product. These products then replace the 
standalone local products (outlined above) of local companies 
that have been acquired. Namely, as they acquire new companies, 
reinsurers consolidate all the separate reinsurance programs 
that these smaller insurers used to buy, as one CEO of a major global insurance company explains: “So in the last 10 years [we] 
have doubled in size with acquisitions in the States and Europe. 
Our original model was probably lots of small businesses that 
all bought their own programs. But as we’ve been through this 
expansion program, virtually every acquisition we do, you get a 
reinsurance synergy from either not having to buy the program 
or combining it with your existing program. So, there’s been an 
evolution toward combining programs through our acquisitions. 
A few years ago we realized that allowing our businesses to pick and choose was inherently ineficient. So we decided to set out 
and do a global deal” [Cedent, interview]. Importantly, from a 
reinsurance perspective, as global reinsurers shift to centralized buying it means that premiums no longer low from local 
programs and the overall amount of premium ceded is reduced, as one reinsurer explains: “They went from buying proportional to 
non-proportional and stopped ceding treaties from local operating 
entities. A lot of meat from the bone was gone for us; we lost 50% of our premium just due to this” [Reinsurer, interview]. Such 
dynamics help explain the increased competitive pressures on reinsurers outlined in the irst section of this article.
 
Summary
Overall, our research suggests the following trends in terms of cedents’ reinsurance product needs: 1) as some of the 
“traditional” reinsurance products mature, such as bouquet 
(single territories, multiple types of risk) and standalone (single 
risk-type single or similar territories) products, demand will 
progressively decline; 2) the demand for other products, such as 
super-risks (covering multiple, or even global territories) 16 will 
grow. Such changes require reinsurers to keep abreast of change 
in order to match their supply of capital with changing patterns 
of demand. We, therefore, end with further implications of such 
trends for reinsurance executives.
16 For ease of explanation in this analysis, we do not distinguish between Excess of Loss (XL) and 
proportional products but rather refer to overall trends in the product types we have previously 
described.
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Final considerations on reinsurance product evolution
There are three main issues that arise from the super-risk product 
and super-cedent growth, which we highlight below. We also suggest ways in which reinsurers can relect upon these issues in relation to their speciic strategic positions and goals. 
Issue 1: Pressure on smaller reinsurers 
From the reinsurer’s point of view, there is a shift from multiple standalone products each yielding smaller, territory-speciic 
premiums, to fewer, larger multi-territory reinsurance products 
each yielding large premiums. The distribution of global 
premium thus also shifts toward these super-risks — forcing more and more reinsurers to ind ways to offer such products. 
This puts pressure on smaller players in the reinsurance 
industry, who struggle for relevance because they can only 
write a tiny fraction of the overall deal. They, therefore, may 
be ignored, or squeezed out of such deals. This difference in 
perspective is outlined from the perspective of a large cedent and a small reinsurer: 
•  Large cedent: “We felt we had such long-term strong 
relationships with three or four global players that we should 
leverage to cement a proper long-term relationship and 
make them our core providers. So, we’re really a believer in 
supporting the stronger balance sheets, the quality players,” 
(Cedent interview). 
•  Small reinsurer: “If we talk about the 10 biggest insurers; 
if you look at their programs it’s going to be a worldwide Cat XL: $2 billion of capacity. What can we do? How can we be with them? We just haven’t got the modelling and also capital 
and capacity to be a meaningful partner to them.” (Cedent 
interview). 
 
For example, the majority of QBE’s global programs are placed 
with three large reinsurers; and recently, much of the remaining available premium (20%) has been placed with Berkshire 
Hathaway.17 In short, the above changes may be responded to 
more effectively by larger reinsurers, while other reinsurers may 
struggle to maintain meaningful partnerships with such large 
cedents. Nonetheless, as Table 1 shows, smaller reinsurers may 
still be well positioned to exploit niches in fast-growing emerging 
markets through in-depth client knowledge.
 
Issue 2: Change in reinsurance operations and resources
Super-risks are a complex product, covering multiple territories 
and perils. This has interrupted the direct link between the origin 
of risk and its cover that is prevalent in stand-alone products. It has also made it more dificult for the requisite knowledge to 
underwrite a deal to reside in a particular person or role (i.e., 
a single underwriter). Instead, reinsurers have to increasingly 
17 Source: http://www.insuranceinsider.com/berkshire-continues-push-with-15-qbe- 
reinsurance-deal.
Cedent type Product type Meaningful partnerships Implications for different types of reinsurers
Global [growth] Super-risks and ART Large – highly analytic – reinsurers Highly analytic; Large player Comparatively comfortable: Larger and — to a 
lesser degree — moderate sized reinsurersRegional [growth] Super-Risks and ART Medium/Large – highly analytic – 
reinsurers
 
 
Local [Decline]
Local programmes Meaningful partnerships possible 
with all types of reinsurer
Dificult space: smaller/less analytic reinsurers 
who relied on these
Bouquets 
[Pushed out increasing demand for 
analysability]
 
 
Less analytic (close to market) 
reinsurers
Emerging  
[Small in premium terms] 
Local Low-tech; size less relevant.  
Niches still available through local market 
knowledgeBouquet
 
  Growth          Decline          Small in premium terms 
Table1. Matching reinsurers and insurers: who is most impacted by trend 
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work in teams and in particular rely on technical resources to 
analyze these complex deals. Super-risks are grounded in more complex inancial modelling than existing products, and so 
require different competencies and technical infrastructure from 
the reinsurers underwriting them than standalone products. 
As super-risk programs increase, fewer reinsurers can handle the level of analysis required. Relecting on the analytical 
competences that comes with the complexity of such deals, one manager of an insurance irm said of his super-risk deal: “Getting the risk home was more dificult just because it’s hugely 
complex and if you like it, you know, the [Company 1 and 2] put 
six months’ work in to it to understanding it” [Cedent interview]. 
If reinsurers are to reposition themselves to offer super-risk 
products, they need to acquire these skills and competencies and 
change their operating structure accordingly.
 
Issue 3: Growth of ART products that compete with 
reinsurance
ART products are usually thought as “non-traditional” 
reinsurance products in that they are not generally offered by 
reinsurers, but instead by hedge funds and other providers 
of capital investment. Yet, these products are in a “growth” phase in the industry [Aon Benield (2013a)]18 and they are no 
longer separate from the reinsurance. For instance, they are an 
attractive option for larger cedents for a number of reasons, 
including diversifying between traditional and non-traditional risk carriers. For example, as the CEO of Allianz Re explains: “About 
one tenth of our overall natural catastrophe protection comes 
from Cat bonds. In conjunction with our protection against US 
natural catastrophe risks, the share of Cat bonds is considerably 
higher, about one-third.”19 ART products are securities whose returns depend on the occurrence of a speciic insurance event 
[Fedorova (2012)]. This is often what large insurers require capital for: peak risks which could signiicantly impact their proitability or even survival. They are also well suited to the complex reinsurance, technicality and capital eficiency needs of 
larger cedents.
In short, from a reinsurer’s point of view, ART products compete 
with traditional reinsurance products; and ILS products (which 
18 Source: http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/09/02/strong-capital-inlows-bring-ils-cat-bond-market-to-new-high-aon-benield/
19 Source: https://www.allianz.com/en/press/news/business/insurance/news_2013-06-12.html
include Cat bonds) are partial substitutes for traditional 
reinsurance. These partial substitutes, which are likely to continue 
to grow in their market share, alter the reinsurance product life 
cycle in ways that threaten existing standalone and bouquet products: as more premium goes into super-risks and ART, a 
declining share is left for standalone and bouquet products. It is 
clear that these trends have different implications for reinsurers 
depending on their positioning; for instance, they are particularly 
worrisome for late adopters and those without the technical or 
capital resources to participate fully in such a suite of products [Aon Benield (2013b)].20 
 
Summary: Recommendations for reinsurers
The above discussion implies a number of recommendations for reinsurers, which we summarize here: 
• As available premium from traditional “standalone” products 
decreases, reinsurers will need to protect their existing 
relationships with their most desirable local clients. They will, 
however, also simultaneously need to establish alternative 
bases for generating the volume of their revenue through 
developing the resources to partner with larger global clients. 
• Smaller reinsurers need to be particularly mindful of deining a proitable niche for themselves in response to these trends. 
Given that they might be less obvious partners for large global irms, they need to look to niche areas where their size means 
they can offer bespoke services or specialize in particular areas 
of expertise. For instance, in a particular emerging market or 
specialty line of business. Smaller reinsurers might also look 
for appropriate joint ventures and partnerships with other 
capital providers in conjunction with developing and protecting proitable niche areas. 
• To analyze mega-risks and meet the needs of global clients, it 
will be necessary for reinsurers to continue to invest heavily in 
analytical infrastructure and expertise. Those that do so will be 
the preferred partners of such global insurers because they are 
able to address their more complex needs. 
• Reinsurers will increasingly be required to engage with ART  
products and new players (e.g., hedge funds) entering the 
reinsurance space. Those that are already proving more 
innovative in their approach to capital provision and cover will 
20 Source: http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/07/12/ils-and-collateralized-capital-low-beneits-reinsurance-buyers-at-renewals-aon/
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be better placed in the coming years. This includes seeking the 
necessary expertise, partnerships and structures to position themselves as potential irms to front the delivery of these 
newer products. 
ConclusionIn this article, we have irst highlighted the general trends 
resulting in increasing competitiveness in the reinsurance 
industry; using a strategy model [Porter (1980)] to structure our 
discussion. Second, we focused on a particularly salient area from which much of these competitive dynamics stem: consolidation 
in the primary industry, which we describe as part of life cycle 
analysis of the insurance sector. Third, we highlighted how the 
industry life cycle in the insurance sector is impacting reinsurance 
buying, thus having important impact on the reinsurance industry 
that reinsurance executives should be particularly mindful of. Finally, we outlined some speciic implications for reinsurance executives and irms, based on this analysis of changes in the 
product life cycle. 
Through building an overview of the industry and focusing on 
consolidation in the primary sector, we sought to put some of the strategic decisions and dificulties facing reinsurers in context. 
This should provide those reinsurers with greater understanding 
of the challenges they face and, thus, how to cope with them.
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